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Women before the qāḍī under the Abbasids 
 
by 
 
Mathieu Tillier 
(University of Oxford) 
 
 
Abstract: In this article, I examine the appearance of Muslim women before the judge during the 
Abbasid period (132-334/750-945), both in theory and practice. The cases involving women found in 
law books suggest that they came freely to the court, especially for familial or marital purposes, and 
that the judges employed some women as court auxiliaries. However, a comparison of judicial manuals 
and the biographical literature shows that a woman’s appearance before the judge could create a social 
disturbance and that not all women were allowed to appear in court. I argue that the social distinction 
between those who could leave their houses – and thus come before the judge – and those who could 
not correlated with the social hierarchy.  
 
Based on Islamic court registers (sijillāt), several specialists in Ottoman history have 
analyzed the social and gender distribution of the litigants who appeared before the qāḍī, the 
Islamic judge. Some studies show that women represented a non-negligible percentage of the 
litigants – often more than ten percent.
1
 Unfortunately, because of the lack of documents for 
the first centuries of Islam, researchers cannot reach precise results.
2
 Judicial practices can be 
studied only through literary sources, like biographical dictionaries and law compendia. 
                                                 
I wish to thank David Powers, Christopher Melchert and Karen Bauer for their comments on a previous draft of 
this article. 
1
 One of the first quantitative studies of women in Ottoman courts was undertaken by R. C. Jennings, “Women 
in Early 17
th
 Century Ottoman Judicial Records – The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri,” JESHO, 18 (1975), 
53-114. See also Y. J. Seng, “Invisible Women: Residents of Early Sixteenth-Century Istanbul,” in G. R. G. 
Hambly, Women in the Medieval Islamic World. Power, Patronage, and Piety (London, MacMillan, 1998), 241-
68. For a review of studies on women under the Ottomans, see I. Agmon, “Women’s History and Ottoman 
Sharia Court Records,” Hawwa, 2 (2004), 175 ff. 
2
 The main exception is represented by the documents of the Geniza, which allowed S. D. Goitein to analyze the 
phenomenon of Jewish women appearing in the rabbinical court of Fusṭāṭ, mostly during the 11
th
 and 12
th
 
centuries. S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society. The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in 
the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1967-93), 
3:332-6. 
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Nevertheless, the frequent appearance of women in the available sources suggests that the 
situation was not very different in early Islam.  
Muslim women reportedly were confined to private space, while public space was 
reserved for men. The qāḍī’s tribunal, usually held in the chief mosque of the city, served as 
public space par excellence: anyone could attend it, enter a complaint, or simply hear others’ 
complaints. It is necessary to investigate the sources in an effort to reconstruct the actual 
position of women at the qāḍī’s court. An exploration of the legal literature reveals what 
kinds of cases involving women were expected to be brought before the qāḍī. I rely especially 
on the Iraqi al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261/874), a Ḥanafī jurist who, in the middle of the ninth century, 
wrote an important adab al-qāḍī manual, and on its tenth-century commentary by al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 
370/980). In fact, these two works can hardly be separated: al-Khaṣṣāf’s original text is 
included in al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s commentary. I will argue that, despite the absence of legal restrictions 
on the appearance of women before a judge, the prevailing social norm discouraged some 
women from appearing in court, and that gender issues must be viewed within their specific 
social context. 
 
1. Legal cases involving Muslim women 
  
1.1. Women as litigants 
Women appear frequently in law books about family matters. Ḥanafī jurists discuss 
several types of cases in which women might be involved in a lawsuit.  
The first category deals with personal status, that is, cases relating to marriage and 
divorce. A man could allege, for example, that a woman was his wife.
3
 As al-Khaṣṣāf 
explains, a woman whose husband went on a long journey and did not return may have 
remarried; then the first husband might come back and claim that he is her legal husband.
4
 
Other cases come to mind: David Powers mentions the case of a woman in the fifteenth-
century Maghrib who fled from her husband and remarried in a neighboring village.
5
 A 
woman also could allege that a man was her husband.
6
 Women were more often involved in 
                                                 
3
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Farḥāt Ziyāda (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1978), 138, 378, 
419, 531. 
4
 Ibid., 379. 
5
 D. S. Powers, “Four Cases Relating to Women and Divorce in al-Andalus and the Maghrib, 1100-1500,” in M. 
K. Masud et al., Dispensing Justice in Islam. Qadis and their Judgments (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006), 402. 
6
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 531. 
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divorce lawsuits. A woman who wanted to be separated from her husband might claim that he 
had repudiated her three times,
7
 or she might claim that her marriage was null and void.
8
 A 
husband could ask the judge to nullify his marriage if his wife suffered from a crippling defect 
like madness or severe illness (e.g. baraṣ, leprosy).9 
The second category relates to material claims on a husband. Several kinds of cases can be 
singled out. (1) A woman might complain about the dower (mahr): although the claimant was 
usually the wife’s father, the judge could summon the wife to ask her about her father’s 
claim.
10
 (2) She could complain about the nafaqa or maintenance allowance provided by the 
husband for his wife’s daily needs. Women filed complaints against husbands who did not 
provide them with enough money or equipment,
11
 or who had to go on a journey of several 
months, and they asked the qāḍī to appoint a guarantor (kafīl) who would be responsible for 
paying their nafaqa.12 Alternatively, a woman could ask her brother or another relative to pay 
her nafaqa. If her husband disappeared, she could go to the qāḍī and ask him to appoint an 
agent (wakīl) to manage the husband’s property and pay her the nafaqa. (3) A woman could 
ask for material commodity, like new dresses,
13
 or ask for the employment of a cook.
14
 (4) 
Finally, some divorced women appeared before the judge to receive permission to take their 
children away from their father to another city.
15
 
Another category is sexual intercourse. A wife might accuse her husband of engaging in 
illicit sexual relations with another woman (zinā).16 The jurists commonly dealt with the case 
in which one of the spouses could not or did not fulfill his or her sexual obligations. For 
example, a woman complained that her husband had sworn not to touch her and respected this 
oath for four mouths (īlā). In this instance, the qāḍī could impose a divorce between them.17 
Sexual incapacity was also the subject of lawsuits: divorce was automatic if the wife was 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 138, 343, 377. 
8
 Ibid., 379. 
9
 Ibid., 344. 
10
 Ibid., 622, 626, 628. 
11
 Ibid., 646 ff. 
12
 Ibid., 645. 
13
 Ibid., 660. 
14
 Ibid., 650. 
15
 Ibid., 690. 
16
 Ibid., 341. 
17
 Ibid., 165. Cf. D. S. Powers, “Four Cases,” 395. 
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physically incapable of sexual intercourse.
18
 More frequently, however, jurists deal with the 
incapacity of men: according to Ḥanafī law, the qāḍī should pronounce the divorce 
immediately if a husband appears to be castrated.
19
 If he was sexually impotent, the qāḍī 
instituted a long procedure (sometimes lasting more than a year) to determine whether or not 
he would regain his sexual potency. If the wife proved that her husband was impotent, she 
was given the choice of remaining married or divorcing him.
20
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains that sexual 
intercourse is a wife’s right.
21
 Although in theory Islamic law restricts a woman’s capacity to 
ask for divorce, the cases relating to sexuality suggest that some women used judicial 
strategies to obtain it. This hypothesis is confirmed by al-Subkī, who relates how a woman 
obtained a divorce after complaining that her husband’s penis was too large (shakat ilay-hi 
imra’a kubr ālat zawji-hā).22 
An ill-treated woman might file a complaint against her husband. In Ḥanafī law, a woman 
cannot obtain a divorce if her husband harms her.
23
 However, according to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, the qāḍī 
must prevent her husband from abusing her.
24
 He can order a man to let his wife live in the 
house of respectable neighbors (ṣāliḥīn) who will inform the qāḍī about the husband’s 
behavior with his wife. If it appears that he is in fact maltreating her, the qāḍī will reprimand 
him or sentence him to physical punishment.
25
 According to Maribel Fierro, such a procedure, 
found also in Maghribī Mālikī law, may have originated in local Berber customs.
26
 The 
mention of this procedure in early Ḥanafī law, however, suggests that this practice originated 
in the east or, at least, was widespread in the Islamic empire from an early period.  
                                                 
18
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 643. 
19
 Ibid., 643. 
20
 Ibid., 633-34. Cf. D. S. Powers, “Four Cases,” 396; N. Hentati, “L’iʿdhār : une procédure judicaire dans le 
droit musulman,” ILS, 13 (2006), 400-1. 
21
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 632. 
22
 Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya l-kubrā, ed. M. M. al-Ṭanāḥī and ʿA.-F. M. al-Ḥulw (Cairo: Hajr, 1413 H.), 
3:452. For a different opinion, see Th. Bianquis, La famille arabe (Bruxelles: Complexe, 2005), 34. 
23
 For the position of Mālikī jurists on this issue, see M. Marìn, “Disciplining Wives: A Historical Reading of 
Qur’ân 4:34,” Studia Islamica, 97 (2003), 31 
24
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 652. 
25
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 652. 
26
 M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women Seeking Divorce: the Qur’ānic two Arbiters and Judicial Practice among the 
Malikis in al-Andalus and North Africa,” in M. K. Masud et al., Dispensing Justice in Islam, 344. 
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Finally, women were involved in lawsuits about inheritance,
27
 kinship (for example if a 
woman claims that a foundling is her brother and asks the judge to entrust her with the 
child),
28
 or criminal matters (murder or illegal sexual intercourse).
29
 Al-Khaṣṣāf relates the 
story of a young woman who, upon reaching puberty, asked the qāḍī for permission to choose 
which of her divorced parents she would live with.
30
 
On the whole, most of the cases involving women in al-Khaṣṣāf’s Adab al-qāḍī are related 
to family law and personal status. Al-Khaṣṣāf refers to women when their gender is essential 
to the substance of the case. However, he does not cite women involved in lawsuits where 
their gender is immaterial, as commercial litigations. Al-Khaṣṣāf’s Adab al-qāḍī, thus, reflects 
only women’s involvement in typically female cases, and leaves in the dark their possible 
participation in other types of lawsuits. 
 
1.2. Women as auxiliaries in the qāḍī’s court 
 The qāḍī’s court was not reserved exclusively for men. Many familial matters compelled 
the judge to use female auxiliaries. He needed female judicial experts to investigate women’s 
virginity or pregnancy, their sexual defects, and matters relating to hidden parts of the female 
body (like abortion, birth and suckling); this type of expertise was commonly recommended 
in lawsuits about female slaves, e.g., when a buyer accuses the seller of fraud.
31
 Such experts 
would determine if a young girl was physically capable of engaging in sexual relations before 
she got married,
32
 or would examine young wives who reportedly were incapable of engaging 
in sexual relations.
33
 According to al-Khaṣṣāf and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, several women might act as 
experts for the same case. 
The status of a female expert’s word and its value before the judge is striking. Usually, 
male Muslim experts are recognized as witnesses, and their word is considered as a testimony 
                                                 
27
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 398, 404. 
28
 Ibid., 532. 
29
 Ibid., 349. 
30
 Ibid., 690. 
31
 Ibid., 178, 558, 561, 562. 
32
 Ibid., 629. 
33
 Ibid., 630, 633. See R. Shaham, “Women as Expert Witnesses in Pre-Modern Islamic Courts,” in R. Shaham 
(ed.), Law, Custom, and Statute in the Muslim World. Studies in Honor of Aharon Layish (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 
2007), 49-63. Cf. D. Serrano, “Rape in Maliki Legal Doctrine and Practice (8
th
-15
th
 Centuries C.E.),” Hawwa, 5 
(2007), 178-9. 
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(šahāda) or information (khabar).34 According to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, however, a woman’s word cannot 
cancel a contract, and her statement must be treated as a claim (daʿwā). For this reason, a 
litigant who disagrees with her may swear that she is wrong. The judge considers him 
innocent and the woman’s word is rejected.
35
 According to some Ḥanafī jurists, however, 
virginity, pregnancy and menstruation can be established only by female experts, and their 
word must always be recognized as valid in these matters.
36
 Al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) tends 
to recognize women’s expertise as authentic testimony. He defines a female’s report 
concerning the intimate parts of another female as information (khabar), similar in nature to a 
report going back to a single authority (al-āḥād); but it is also a testimony (shahāda), as she 
must be a free Muslim and use the formulary “I testify” (ashhadu) in the judicial proceeding. 
Moreover, her word is binding, as the qāḍī bases his judgment on it.37 
In addition, the qāḍī employed women as auxiliaries when a defendant (male or female) 
refused to appear in court and hid at home. He had to send two trustworthy men with several 
women and servants (khadam): the male auxiliaries would encircle his house and prevent 
anyone from leaving, while the women and the servants would enter the house, drive away its 
female inhabitants and look for the defendant. If they found him, they compelled him to 
appear at the qāḍī’s court.38 Thus, women were needed to enter the private space of the house, 
which had to remain hidden from the eyes of any man outside the inner circle of the family.
39
 
Women also investigated female witnesses in an effort to determine whether they were 
trustworthy and honorable. According to al-Khaṣṣāf, only women who are used to mixing 
with people in the public sphere can conduct this type of investigation.
40
  
                                                 
34
 J.-P. Van Staëvel, “Savoir voir et le faire savoir : l’expertise judiciaire en matière de construction, d’après un 
auteur tunisois du 8
e
/XIV
e
 siècle,” Annales Islamologiques, 35 (2001), 654. 
35
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 558. 
36
 Ibid., 560. Cf. M. Fadel, “Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal 
Thought,” IJMES, 29 (1997), 195. 
37
 R. Shaham, “Women as Expert Witnesses,” 48-49. 
38
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 252. See F.J. Ziadeh, “Compelling Defendant’s Appearance at Court in Islamic 
Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 3 (1996), 310. 
39
 On the private status of the house, which could not be entered legally without permission, see E. Alshech, 
““Do Not Enter Houses Other Than Your Own”: the Evolution of the Notion of a Private Domestic Sphere in 
Early Sunnī Islamic Thought,” Islamic Law and Society, 11 (2004), 295ff. This procedure suggests that al-
Khaṣṣāf still held the interventionist view of the Ḥanafī Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) who, unlike the jurists of other 
madhhabs, allowed entering the house without the permission of its inhabitants. Ibid., 298. 
40
 Ibid., 314, 422; see also al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 314. 
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Finally, a woman might serve as trustworthy agent (amīn) to look after another woman, 
usually a slave, who claimed to be free, or when two litigants claimed to be her legal owner. 
The qāḍī entrusted the slave girl to a female agent in order to prevent her from having sexual 
intercourse with one of the two litigants until the resolution of the case.
41
 This procedure 
might also involve a free woman who claimed that she had been repudiated three times, in 
order to take her away from her husband before the qāḍī formally pronounced the divorce.42 
These cases show that the judiciary needed female auxiliaries who might intervene in all 
situations in which there was a violation of the ḥaram – the domestic, private or female space 
– forbidden to any man outside the inner circle of the family. In theory, Ḥanafīs even 
recognized a woman’s right to be a qāḍī.43 Indeed, in the first Ḥanafī adab al-qāḍī books, 
women were to a large extent integrated into the court. They appeared in this literature both as 
plaintiffs and as judicial auxiliaries. 
 
2. Looking for the archetypal female litigant 
 
The fact that fiqh books devote considerable attention to women appearing in court leads 
us to wonder whether religious models contributed to the shaping of legal theory. Few if any 
explicit injunctions calling on women to appear in the qāḍī’s court are found in the fiqh 
literature. Although the jurists do not mention any explicit model, implicit models may 
                                                 
41
 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 377. 
42
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 377. Cf. M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 338. 
43
 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 354. Whereas Ḥanafīs limited women’s adjudication to non-ḥudūd 
cases, al-Ṭabarī allowed them to adjudicate any dispute. The Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs held that only men can serve 
as judges. Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya (Constitutiones Politicae), ed. M. Enger (Bonn: Adolphus 
Marcus, 1853), 107-8; id., Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Muḥyī Hilāl al-Sarḥān (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-irshād, 1971), 1:625-
8; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Ḥulw (Cairo: Hajr, 
1986-90), 14:12-13 (I owe this reference to Christopher Melchert). Byzantine law also excluded women from 
serving as judges. J. Beaucamp, “Les femmes et l’espace public à Byzance : le cas des tribunaux,” Dumbarton 
Oaks Papers, 52 (1998), 132. Despite the theoretical recognition of women serving as judges in Ḥanafī law, E. 
Tyan found only one female judge in Islamic pre-modern history: Thaml/Thumal was appointed at the maẓālim 
court in 306/918-19, under al-Muqtadir. E. Tyan, Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire en pays d’Islam (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1960), 162; see also Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa’l-umam, ed. Suhayl Zakkār 
(Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1995), 8:12; N. M. El-Cheikh, “The Qahramâna in the Abbasid Court: Position and 
Functions,” Studia Islamica, 97 (2003), 52-53.  
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nevertheless have shaped mentalities. We will concentrate here on two examples taken from 
the Qur’ān and the Sīra. 
First, the Qur’ān exhorts the Muslim community to resort to justice when a married couple 
is confronted with discord: “If you fear dissension between a married couple, send forth an 
arbiter from his family and an arbiter from her family. If they desire reconciliation, God will 
bring them together. God is All-Knowing, All-Discerning.” (Q. 4:35)
44
 According to Maribel 
Fierro, this verse “was never understood to refer to every case of marital discord, given the 
husband’s right to repudiate his wife that is clearly established in other Qur’ānic verses.”
45
 
The exhortation was understood in the context of Q. 4:34, which allows the husband to take 
action against his wife if she disobeys him: “if after having been admonished, banished and 
beaten, the rebellious wife still does not obey the husband, then the two arbiters should be 
appointed. Presumably, it is the husband who asks for arbitration because, for whatever 
reason, he has no desire to divorce his rebellious wife.”
46
 However, jurists also understood 
this rule as “a mechanism for a wife to seek a judicial divorce on the ground of harm.”
 47
 
Q. 4:35 was revealed in an Arabian context where there were no state institutions such as 
the office of qāḍī. The Qur’ān mentions two ḥakams or arbiters chosen by the litigants, who 
determine whether they should stay married or divorce.
48
 This understanding of Q. 4:35 is 
reported by al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923). At the end of the 3
rd
/9
th
 century, however, the sulṭān or his 
delegate was probably the main supervisor of the procedure: the litigants had to complain 
before him, and he had to choose the two ḥakams if he lacked a clear understanding of the 
situation of the spouses. Here, the ḥakams act as agents (wakīls) who negotiate an agreement 
between the litigants.
49
 If the spouses refuse to invest them with the power of decision, they 
intervene as experts or witnesses before the sulṭān to determine which of the spouses is at 
fault.
50
 As Fierro has shown, when this procedure was enforced in practice, it was usually the 
                                                 
44
 Translation by Tarif Khalidi, The Qur’an (London: Penguin Classics), 2008, 67. 
45
 M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 325. 
46
 Ibid., 325. The commentators explain that the “rebellion” of the wife may be caused by the conduct of her 
husband, or by too small a nafaqa. See references infra. 
47
 Ibid., 326. 
48
 See Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778?), Tafsīr al-Thawrī (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1403 H.), 94-95. 
49
 This corresponds to the Ḥanafī doctrine, which considers the ḥakamān to be mere agents of the spouses. 
Therefore, their decision is not binding. According to the Mālikīs, however, the arbiters are entitled to impose a 
divorce. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 329, 331. 
50
 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1404 H.), 5:70-71, 75-76. Cf. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil b. 
Sulaymān, ed. A. Farīd (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya), 2003, 1:228. 
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qāḍī who appointed the two ḥakams:51 this suggests that the litigants had already brought suit 
before the qāḍī. Whatever the modes of application of this procedure may have been in time 
and space, the Qur’ān itself was regarded as encouraging both men and women to seek 
justice. 
The commentators explain that other verses are related to a judicial context. According to 
al-Ṭabarī, Q. 58:1ff. were revealed when an Anṣārī woman (named Khawla or Khuwayla)
52
 
came to the Prophet and asked him about her marital situation after her husband told her that 
“her back was like his mother’s back” (a case of ẓihār). In one narrative, al-Ṭabarī compares 
the situation to that of a trial in which the Prophet was supposed to act as a judge and to 
deliver a judgment (fa-yaqḍī fiyya wa-fīka amra-hu).53 In addition to this Anṣārī woman, the 
example of some early Muslim women may have encouraged women to appear in court. It is 
well known that Arab women held an important political and religious position in early Islam, 
especially when they belonged to noble families.
54
 Of the many women who played an 
important role in early Islamic politics, three of them may have influenced women’s position 
in the legal sphere. 
(1) Khadīja, Muḥammad’s first wife, is remembered as an independent woman who 
managed her business affairs by herself. Although her model does not seem to have 
influenced women’s legal status in Islam, her independence may have encouraged women to 
undertake judicial actions before the qāḍī, especially in case of business litigations. 
(2) ʿA/’isha, the youngest of Muḥammad’s wives, is an ambiguous character: she appears 
simultaneously as the archetypal child-wife “that God offered to the pious mature man”
55
 and 
as the woman who opposed ʿUthmān and revolted against ʿAlī, the fourth caliph. During the 
first years of her marriage to the Prophet, she was accused of illegal sexual intercourse (the 
so-called “lie case”, ifk).56 Strictly speaking, this was not a judicial case, as there was no 
                                                 
51
 M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 330. 
52
 On the disagreements about her nasab, see al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, 28:1. Cf. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, 3:329. 
53
 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, 28:5. Earlier tafsīrs, however, do not treat the mujādila as a plaintiff in a trial, but rather as a 
woman seeking the opinion of the Prophet. See Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, 3:329. 
54
 See for example N. Abbott, “Women and the State in Early Islam,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 1 (1942), 
106-126. 
55
 Th. Bianquis, La famille arabe médiévale, 86. 
56
 See Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra l-nabawiyya, Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2001, 674 ff; EI2, s.v. ʿA/’isha bint Abī 
Bakr (W. M. Watt); D. A. Spellberg, Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past. The Legacy of ʿA’isha bint Abi Bakr 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 61 ff. 
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arbiter or judge. Nevertheless, this episode serves as an example – at least for Sunnis – of a 
high-ranking woman involved in a legal matter during the Prophet Muḥammad’s life.
57
 
(3) Muḥammad’s daughter Fāṭima was involved in a legal case: after her father’s death, 
she publicly contested the first caliph’s refusal to award her a share of her father’s estate.
58
  
These three women contributed to the model of the ideal Muslim female.
59
 Reports about 
these exemplary women may have encouraged them to appear in the qāḍī’s court despite the 
limited public role enjoyed by women in Middle Eastern societies.
60
 
 
3. Looking for the practice 
 
3.1. Biographical sources and their data 
Although law books put forth rules for cases in which women might appear in the qāḍī’s 
court, legal doctrine does not necessarily coincide with practice. The jurists talk about women 
only when dealing with female-related issues like dower, nafaqa or divorce. Women were 
deeply involved in economic life, working in crafts (mainly as weavers and spinsters), trade, 
and services to other women (hairdressers, midwives, nurses).
61
 Although they were supposed 
to work at home or in other women’s houses,
62
 far from the public eye, they probably became 
involved in disputes with sellers, clients and partners.
63
 As disputes of this nature are not 
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gender-related, the jurists do not explicitly mention women in connection with these 
“asexual” cases. Therefore, we cannot know whether they were expected to appear in the 
court or not. If we want to understand whether women did in fact appear before the qāḍī, we 
have to look for other sources. Biographical dictionaries contain narratives that may reflect 
social practice, especially those dedicated to qāḍīs such as the books of Wakīʿ (d. 306/918), 
al-Kindī (d. 350/961) and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449).
64
 These dictionaries, which 
contain many references to lawsuits, have usually been regarded as reliable historical sources 
with regard to judicial practices.
65
 The following table presents the main types of cases 
involving women found in biographies of 239 qāḍīs who held office in Iraq (193 qāḍīs, 
mainly in Baghdad, Baṣra, Kūfa and Wāsiṭ) and Egypt (46 qāḍīs, in Fusṭāṭ) during the 
Abbasid period (132-334/750-945). 
 
CASE TYPE NUMBER 
Marriage (woman requesting or refusing marriage)
66
 3 
Alleged/irregular marriage
67
 2 
Divorce
68
 5 
Dower (mahr)69 4 
                                                                                                                                                        
al-Marāghī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-saʿāda, 1947-1950), 1:261; ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī, Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-
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Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1998).  
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Maintenance (nafaqa)70 3 
Child care
71
 2 
Adultery/liʿān72 3 
Problems with sexual intercourse
73
 3 
Undefined marital dispute
74
 1 
Inheritance
75
 2 
Contract/property
76
 2 
Legal penalties (ḥadd)77 1 
Unknown
78
 7 
Total number of female litigants appearing before a qāḍī 38 
Representative acting for a woman
79
 2 
Female witness
80
 2 
 
 
The data fits very well the typology analyzed earlier. Of forty-two accounts of trials 
involving women, twenty-six deal with marital disputes (almost two-thirds of the total). The 
actual rate is probably higher, for six accounts do not explain the nature of the case brought 
before the qāḍī. At first sight, one might conclude that the legal typology reflected in the adab 
al-qāḍī literature was close to judicial practice, and that both the legal and the biographical 
sources portray women as being deeply involved in judicial practice. This would confirm the 
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results of several recent studies devoted to women.
81
 Fatwā literature, usually regarded as 
representative of actual practice, also corroborates the important position of women at the 
qāḍī’s court.82 
The scarcity of references to non-matrimonial cases is striking. Only four accounts deal 
with inheritance, contracts or criminal law (one case of qadhf or slanderous accusation of 
fornication).
83
 The biographical dictionaries dedicated to qāḍīs are generally interested in a 
much larger panel of legal cases. Wakīʿ and al-Kindī show a strong concern for commercial 
matters. Altogether, theirs books contain about 215 reports dealing with commercial claims or 
debts. Therefore, one would expect to find a higher number of narratives referring to the 
involvement of women in commercial litigation. Two complementary hypotheses may be 
formulated. (1) Biographies of qāḍīs do not portray actual judicial practice, but rather 
illustrate theoretical points developed in the legal literature. This would explain why most of 
the cases involving women quoted in the biographical literature fit the typically female cases 
found in the law books. Because the narratives were intended to exemplify the theoretical 
thinking of the fuqahā’, there was no need to mention women appearing before the judge in 
less gender-specific cases. If this hypothesis is confirmed, it would mean that the biographical 
literature complements fiqh books and is part of a wider theoretical literature. The mention of 
women’s cases in biographical literature does not provide a representative picture of how 
often they frequented the court. (2) Despite their strong participation in economic life, women 
appealed to the qāḍī less frequently than men. It thus remains to examine the extent to which 
women had access to the qāḍī’s court. 
 
3.2. Female plaintiffs and social hierarchy 
Although it is now acknowledged that, in the pre-modern period, women were present in 
public space,
84
 the cases brought before the judge could give rise to social disturbance. Many 
cases involving women were related to family or sexual conflicts, private matters that were 
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made public before the court which usually was held in the chief mosque.
85
 Anyone could 
attend the qāḍī’s court and hear the litigants. According to the Ḥanafīs, women appearing as 
litigants or witnesses had to unveil to establish their identities.
86
 This put the woman in an 
awkward position before her relatives and the community. A trial that took place in Baṣra in 
the Umayyad period revealed that a woman had been seduced by a young man, who was 
present in court; her husband was so ashamed that he had no choice but to repudiate her.
87
 In 
286/899 in Rayy, a woman appeared before the qāḍī Mūsā b. Isḥāq al-Khaṭmī, together with 
her guardian (walī), who claimed that her husband had not paid the dower (mahr). When the 
qāḍī asked the witnesses to examine the woman without her veil, her husband immediately 
acknowledged his debt to protect her (and probably himself) from public shame. The wife was 
so grateful to her husband that she renounced the mahr and offered it to him.88 The fact that 
judicial procedure broke the social norm could have negative effects on the qāḍī’s duty to 
“give everyone his due”
 
.
89
 
Al-Khaṣṣāf dedicates several pages to the specific procedures relating to female plaintiffs. 
First, the qāḍī must hear them on a particular day. Whereas men had to write a petition 
(ruqʿa) with their names and their complaints (the qāḍī called them according to the order in 
which he collected the petitions), women did not have to do so, to protect their reputation 
(satr). Al-Khaṣṣāf advises the judge not to call a woman by her name when summoning her.90 
The Ḥanafī jurist clearly understood that unveiling a woman in court contravened the social 
norm. For the sake of justice, not only did the judge and the witnesses have to recognize a 
female plaintiff, but also she had to unveil before the court secretary who was writing the 
minutes (maḥḍar) of the lawsuit. Al-Khaṣṣāf advises the qāḍī to look at her and to describe 
her face to the scribe himself. The qāḍī had to see her in any case: the less she was seen by 
auxiliaries, the better for her honor.
91
 According to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, the judge has to protect the 
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reputation of young and attractive women. If they are old and ugly, however, it is not 
scandalous that everyone see their faces.
92
  
Because the tension between exhibition in court and the social ideal of privacy could not 
be solved in a satisfying way, it is unlikely that all women did go to the qāḍī’s court. Khālid 
b. Ṭalīq, a Baṣran judge from the second half of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century, refused any representative 
(jarī) in court unless the male or female litigant was ill. When witnesses testified that a female 
litigant appointed a representative because of illness, the qāḍī asked them to prove that she 
was ill by bringing a sample of her urine to court.
93
 Such reports suggest that women who did 
not want to appear in court appointed representatives.  
Muslim jurists distinguish between women who can leave their houses and those who 
cannot. The Ḥanafī and Iraqi scholar al-Simnānī (d. 444/1052), for instance, distinguishes 
between the “barza” woman, who is allowed to appear in public, and the “mukhaddara”, who 
is kept in seclusion.
94
  Such a distinction has important consequences for legal procedure. The 
Egyptian Shāfiʿī jurist al-Muzanī (d. 264/877-78) allows a woman to appoint a representative 
(wakīl), whether she is one of “those who go out or those who do not.”95 Ḥanafī jurists did not 
regard the appointment of a wakīl as a satisfactory solution. According to al-Khaṣṣāf, when a 
woman involved in a lawsuit is one of “those who do not go out”, the qāḍī (who cannot leave 
the court) must send her a trustworthy agent (amīn) who replaces him and delivers his 
judgment. The amīn could hear her acknowledgement and make her swear in place of the 
judge.
96
 The same distinction is made in connection with a physical examination to determine 
if a girl is marriageable: the qāḍī can make the determination himself if the girl is from “those 
who go out”, but he must send female experts to her house if that is not the case.
97
 The 
distinction also appears in Maghribī Mālikī law: concerning women’s oaths, Saḥnūn 
distinguishes between those who can go out and those who cannot. The first category must 
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swear at the mosque, while the second go there only for serious cases, at night, so as not to be 
seen; in a minor case, however, they may swear at home before a qāḍī’s agent.98 
The biographical literature confirms that some women did not dare come to the qāḍī’s 
court: at the end of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century, the qāḍī of Kūfa Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth was walking in an 
alley (zuqāq) with his scribe when a young and pretty woman implored him to marry her to 
someone, since her brothers ill-treated her.
99
 Apparently this woman could approach the judge 
only in the private or semi-private space of her alley. Similarly, in Ibn Ḥajar’s book on 
Egyptian judges, we read that the qāḍī Ibn Zabr (d. 377/987) was approached by a man whose 
wife wanted to file a complaint against him. The husband would not let her appear in court, 
because he had sworn to divorce her if she left her house. The qāḍī followed him to a blind 
alley, where the wife explained her case from the roof and the qāḍī pronounced his judgment 
without getting off his mule.
100
  
Who were these women who “did not go out” and could not appear in court? Several 
studies on the Near East in late Antiquity have shown that women’s behavior correlated with 
their social status. According to Joëlle Beaucamp, many women went to the court in 
Byzantine Egypt.
101
 However, not every woman could do so easily. Beaucamp observes that 
between the 4
th
 and the 7
th
 centuries, one in three women turned to a representative when 
involved in a lawsuit.
102
 She concludes that their behavior probably corresponded to a social 
norm: a woman was inclined to ask a man (usually her husband) to represent her before the 
judge. This social norm had a counterpart in Byzantine law: in the Code of Justinian, a 
constitution assigned to Constantine and dated 315 CE forbids women to mix with men at 
meetings and in lawsuits, lest they act indecently and shamelessly. The Byzantine court was a 
masculine public space in which a virtuous woman should not be present; so long as she had a 
father or a husband who could deal with her business, she had to avoid the court.
103
 In 6
th
-
century Najrān, E. A. Doumato notes, the veiling and seclusion of women were class-related 
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practices. Respectable women received only women as guests in their private apartments and 
never showed their faces outside. Lower-class women behaved differently: “sex segregation 
can only function in societies in which there are working women who are not veiled or 
secluded, because they serve as intermediaries between secluded women and the public, and 
make the seclusion of some women feasible.”
104
 Do such class-related practices explain the 
reluctance of some Muslim women to appear in the qāḍī’s court? 
The legal literature suggests that a woman’s social position correlates with whether or not 
she appears in court. Despite the theoretical equality of the litigants,
105
 Islamic law recognizes 
the existence of a social hierarchy and recommends that the qāḍī take it into consideration in 
his judgments. When a wife asks for maintenance (nafaqa), for example, he must take her 
economic and social status into account. If she is from a modest background, the qāḍī must 
award her a small maintenance even if her husband is rich and a spendthrift. If she is a rich 
woman, the judge must award her a large maintenance.
106
 In the case of seclusion (during a 
woman’s ʿidda,107 or if her husband prohibits her from leaving the house without his 
consent),
108
 al-Sarakhsī proposes that the ruling should be adapted to the woman’s social 
status. Unlike free women, who must stay at home during the entirety of the ʿidda period, 
female slaves – even one who has been manumitted (mudabbara), is an umm walad109 or 
enjoys a contract of enfranchisement (mukātaba) – generally can leave their houses during 
their ʿidda, especially if they have to work for their master or to purchase their freedom.110  
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Some jurists expressly state that the appearance of women before the qāḍī depends on 
their social status. In the 4
th
/10
th
 century, the Shāfiʿī Ibn al-Qāṣṣ (d. 335/946), who originated 
from Ṭabaristān and lived in Iraq and Syria, mentions in the context of oaths sworn by women 
“noble women who do not go out” (nisā’ min ahl al-sharaf lā takhruj): like al-Khaṣṣāf and 
the Mālikī jurists, he holds that the qāḍī can make women swear at home, and must send them 
two amīns who take their oath. He also emphasizes the problem of women unveiling before 
the qāḍī, stating that a female witness may remain veiled when testifying, provided that two 
honorable witnesses (ʿadl) testify to her identity.111 The fact that some high-ranking women 
were reluctant to appear in the qāḍī’s court is confirmed in biographical accounts. Ca. 
155/772 in Baṣra, a low-ranking Nabaṭī (i.e. Aramean Iraqi autochthon) complained against a 
noble woman, the daughter of a former governor of the city. The qāḍī Sawwār b. ʿAbd Allāh 
summoned the woman but she refused to come, and the governor blamed the qāḍī for asking 
such a high-ranking woman to appear in court.
112
 When the Egyptian qāḍī Ghawth b. 
Sulaymān was ordered to adjudicate a matrimonial conflict between the caliph al-Manṣūr and 
his wife, Umm Mūsā – a noble woman from the tribe of Ḥimyar – he asked Umm Mūsā to 
appoint a wakīl to represent her before him:113 this suggests that the caliph’s wife was not 
supposed to appear before a judge. In the same period, however, some women of high socio-
economic status complained directly to the qāḍī. These include a landlady who sued the 
Kūfan governor before Sharīk b. ʿAbd Allāh,
114
 and a noble woman from the Banū ʿIjl who 
asked the qāḍī Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth to marry her to someone.115 These counter-examples may be 
markers of a progressive transition toward stricter seclusion within the upper classes of large 
Abbasid cities.
116
 The increasing weight of this social norm at the end of the 2
nd
/8
th
 century 
probably led to the exclusion of some women from the court. 
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Conclusion 
In contrast to Byzantine law, Ḥanafī doctrine do not discourage women from coming to 
the court: Muslim women have the right to come to the mosque, to complain, to testify and to 
act as judicial agents. The example of the Prophet’s wives and daughters may have 
contributed to this entitlement. It is more complicated to understand the actual practice of 
women. At first sight, evidence for this practice is found in biographical reports about women. 
However, the close correspondence of these reports to the typical “feminine” cases treated in 
law books calls into question their connection with actual practice. Because of their important 
contribution to economic life, the scarcity of references to commercial litigations involving 
women seems suspect. Women who were involved in commercial matters may have brought 
their disputes before the qāḍī only infrequently because of the socio-economic structure of 
labor (many women worked for their husbands or their masters and therefore were not 
autonomous “partners”),
117
 but this does not explain the whole phenomenon.  
The legal and biographical literature both suggest that practice was more varied. First, the 
necessity to unveil before the judge, in a public space, was perceived as shameful and source 
of dishonor to women. Second, Muslim jurists had to distinguish between women who could 
come easily and complain before the qāḍī and “respectable” women who did not leave their 
houses. This distinction appears in the writings of jurists belonging to different madhhabs and 
provinces (Ṭabaristān, Iraq, Egypt, Maghrib), and it suggests that such a distinction spread 
throughout the Islamic empire. In the Abbasid period, the women who did not leave their 
houses were probably high-ranking women.
118
 According to a prevalent social practice in the 
late antique Near East, high-ranking women must avoid public exposure. It is likely that their 
conduct served as a model that spread to other women. From the 3
rd
/9
th
 century onwards, the 
qāḍī’s court became a space that was attended by men and low-status women. A non-
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negligible number of cases involving women may have been brought before the more 
informal institutions of mediation and arbitration, those of wise and learned men or women 
locally recognized, in a quarter or a town, for their skills in solving conflicts.
119
 This does not 
mean that women (even high-ranking women) could not use the judicial system. Rather the 
system had to adapt, encouraging women to use a representative and allowing them to take 
the oath before a judge’s agent. The issue of women’s appearance in court highlights the 
adaptability of Muslim jurists and the ongoing and continuous interaction between legal 
theory and actual social practices.  
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